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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1215 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND ZARECK, 
                          Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                         
District Court No. 2-09-cr-00168-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  September 29, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                           
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 A jury convicted Raymond Zareck of being (1) a felon in possession of a 
firearm and (2) a drug user or addict in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (3) and 924(e)(1).  After this Court vacated his initial 
sentence on a narrow legal error, the District Court conducted a limited 
resentencing and sentenced Zareck to 188 months in prison.  This was the same 
sentence he received initially.  Zareck now appeals his sentence for the second 
time.  We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 In April of 2009, police arrested Zareck after he sold drugs to a confidential 
informant as part of a controlled buy.  During a subsequent search of Zareck’s 
home, officers found a shotgun, ammunition, and a number of other incriminating 
items.  Based on this, a federal grand jury indicted Zareck on one count of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),1 and one 
count of being a drug user or addict in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).  A jury convicted Zareck on both counts.   
 At sentencing, because Zareck had three previous convictions for “serious 
drug offense[s]” prior to committing the instant offense, the District Court 
concluded that he qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career 
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Criminal Act (ACCA), thus triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Consistent with § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.), the District Court therefore set 
Zareck’s offense level at 33.  It also relied on these previous drug convictions to 
calculate Zareck’s criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, resulting in a 
criminal history category of IV and an advisory Guidelines range of 188 to 235 
months imprisonment.  Based on this range, the Court sentenced Zareck to 188 
months in prison on the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession count, and a concurrent 
188 month sentence on the § 922(g)(3) drug-user-in-possession count.   
 Zareck then appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court, arguing that 
his previous state-court drug convictions did not qualify as “serious drug offenses” 
for purposes of his ACCA enhancement and that the District Court erred by 
imposing separate sentences for each of the § 922(g) convictions even though 
those convictions were based on the same conduct.  The government conceded that 
it was error for the District Court to impose separate sentences for each of Zareck’s 
convictions under § 922(g)(1) and (3).  As for the first point, a panel of this Court 
summarily rejected Zareck’s argument that his state-court convictions were not 
“serious drug offenses,” calling this argument “meritless.”  United States v. Zareck, 
                                                                                                                                        
1 As alleged in the indictment, Zareck was previously convicted of several state-
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588 F. App’x 100, 100 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (Zareck I).  The panel vacated his 
sentence and remanded to the District Court to determine under which subpart of 
§ 922(g) to impose sentence and to resentence Zareck accordingly.  Id. at 101. 
 On remand, the District Court determined that the offense level (and 
therefore the Guidelines range) was the same under both counts.  And because the 
panel in Zareck I had already considered and rejected Zareck’s arguments 
regarding the treatment of his state-court convictions as predicate offenses for 
purposes of the ACCA enhancement, the District Court concluded that it did not 
need to give de novo consideration to these arguments.  Instead, the Court on 
remand allowed Zareck to try to satisfy the standard for obtaining reconsideration 
by showing that relevant law has changed, by presenting previously unavailable 
evidence, or by demonstrating that manifest injustice would result absent 
reconsideration.  Because he failed to meet this burden, it stayed with its original 
findings regarding Zareck’s status as a career criminal under ACCA and again 
imposed a sentence of 188 months in prison solely on the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-
possession count.  Zareck then filed a timely notice of appeal.2 
II.  ANALYSIS 
                                                                                                                                        
court crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.   
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 On appeal (for the second time), Zareck raises two principal arguments.  
First, he claims it was error for the District Court to limit the scope of the 
resentencing to simply selecting the appropriate subpart of § 922(g) to sentence 
him under; instead, he argues that the Court should have conducted a de novo 
resentencing.3  Second, he claims that the District Court erred by treating his state-
court convictions as predicate offenses under ACCA.  We address each argument 
in turn. 
A.  Scope of Mandate for Resentencing 
 Zareck claims that, because the panel opinion in Zareck I did not specify 
whether his resentencing should be de novo or limited to only certain issues, the 
District Court should have conducted a de novo resentencing.  We disagree. 
 In United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013), we explained 
that “[d]istrict courts should resentence de novo when an interdependent count of 
an aggregate sentence is vacated.”  Id. at 734 (citing United States v. Davis, 112 
F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Counts are interdependent when they “result in an 
aggregate sentence, not sentences which may be treated discretely.”  United States 
                                                                                                                                        
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
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v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2010).  But when vacating a count of 
conviction does not “affect [the defendant’s] total offense level, Guideline range, 
or sentence, . . . resentencing de novo is not required.”  Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 
735.   
 Zareck explicitly acknowledges that his initial sentence did not involve 
interdependent counts.4  Nevertheless, he argues that vacating one of the two 
                                                                                                                                        
3 Whether the District Court erred by conducting a limited resentencing presents a 
legal question subject to plenary review.  See United States v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 616, 
619 (3d Cir. 2011).  
4 Miller and Davis provide examples of aggregate sentences involving 
interdependent counts.  In Miller, the defendant was convicted of (among other 
crimes) one count of receiving child pornography and one count of possessing 
child pornography.  594 F.3d at 175-76.  At sentencing, the district court grouped 
the two child pornography offenses together and used the count with the highest 
offense level (the receipt count) to determine the group’s offense level in order to 
calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range.  Id. at 180-81.  After we ordered the 
district court to vacate one of the defendant’s child pornography counts on double 
jeopardy grounds, the district court vacated the receipt count and resentenced the 
defendant.  Id. at 176.  Because the counts were grouped at the initial sentencing, 
we concluded that the defendant’s sentence was an aggregate sentence requiring de 
novo resentencing.  Id. at 181.   
Similarly, in Davis, the defendant was convicted of various drug offenses and of 
using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense.  112 F.3d at 119.  
The drug counts and the firearm count were grouped at sentencing.  After we 
vacated the defendant’s firearm count and remanded for resentencing, the district 
court applied a sentencing enhancement (for possessing a firearm during a drug 
trafficking offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)) that the court previously was 
unable to apply because of the presence of the firearm count.  We upheld the 
court’s application of this enhancement after concluding that the defendant’s initial 
sentence was an aggregate sentence involving interdependent counts.  Thus, de 
novo resentencing was required.  Id. at 121. 
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§ 922(g) counts “materially changed the picture before the [District] Court on 
resentencing.”  Appellant Br. 16.  Besides this bare assertion, however, Zareck 
fails to explain how the “picture” looked any different upon resentencing – either 
in terms of the § 3553(a) factors or with reference to any other relevant metric – 
such that de novo resentencing was required.  And, based on our own analysis, 
neither can we perceive any material change.   
 Zareck’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), is similarly unavailing.  In Pepper, the Court held that 
a sentencing court must be permitted to consider evidence of post-sentencing 
rehabilitation when resentencing a defendant whose initial sentence has been 
overturned on appeal.  Id. at 490.  But Zareck did not attempt to present to the 
District Court any evidence that he has been rehabilitated since his initial 
sentencing.  Nor does he claim on appeal that he would have presented such 
evidence had the District Court conducted a de novo resentencing.  
 We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not err by limiting the 
scope of Zareck’s resentencing to the issues for which this Court in Zareck I 
remanded for resentencing.    
B.  State-court Convictions as Predicates under ACCA 
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 Because we conclude that the District Court correctly limited the scope of 
Zareck’s resentencing, and because Zareck I already considered and rejected 
Zareck’s arguments regarding his eligibility for the ACCA enhancement based on 
his previous state-court drug convictions, see Zareck I, 588 F. App’x at 100 n.2, we 
review his ACCA arguments only to ensure that the prior determination was not so 
clearly erroneous as to result in manifest injustice.  In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 
F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he [law of the case] doctrine does not preclude 
our reconsideration of previously decided issues in extraordinary circumstances 
such as where: (1) new evidence is available; (2) a supervening new law has been 
announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and would create 
manifest injustice.”).5   
 The first of Zareck’s ACCA predicate convictions involved a pair of 
prescription drug sales to the same confidential informant that took place about a 
week apart back in 1988.  Based on these, Zareck was charged with, and entered a 
plea of nolo contendere to, two counts of violating 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-
113(a)(30), which prohibits “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
                                           
5 Zareck does not claim that he has found previously unavailable evidence to 
support his arguments, nor that there has been any intervening change in the law 
since the Court in Zareck I rejected his career criminal arguments.  Indeed, he 
explicitly relies solely on the “manifest injustice” exception to the law of the case 
doctrine.   
 9 
 
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.”  His second conviction came after 
Zareck engaged in three prescription drug sales over the course of about six weeks 
later in 1988.  Again, he was charged with multiple counts of violating 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30).6  Again, he entered a plea of nolo contendere on all 
counts.  Then, in 1990, Zareck was caught selling prescription drugs to an 
undercover agent.  He was again charged with multiple counts of violating 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30), as well as several other state-law counts.  This time, 
a jury convicted him.   
 Zareck first argues that these three state-court drug convictions cannot serve 
as three separate predicate offenses under ACCA because they were all “part of a 
larger course of conduct” and thus should have been treated as a single conviction 
for purposes of the ACCA enhancement.  Appellant’s Br. 22-23.  Zareck is wrong.  
Per United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1989), we apply the 
“‘separate episodes’ test,” id. at 74 (quoting United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 
889 (2d Cir. 1989)), whereby “individual convictions may be counted for purposes 
of [the ACCA] sentencing enhancement so long as the criminal episodes 
underlying the convictions were distinct in time,” id. at 73.  Each of Zareck’s state-
                                           
6 Zareck was also charged with multiple counts of violating 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 780-113(a)(14), which criminalizes “[t]he administration, dispensing, delivery, 
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court convictions was based on different drug sales to different individuals, with 
months, if not years, separating each transaction.  Thus, the District Court did not 
err – much less clearly so – in concluding that the convictions should be counted 
separately for ACCA purposes.  
 Zareck’s next set of arguments centers on whether his state-court 
convictions constitute “serious drug offenses” under ACCA.  As an initial matter, 
it is clear that a conviction under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) can serve as a 
predicate offense under ACCA, so long as the controlled substance at issue 
conviction carries with it a maximum sentence of at least ten years.  See United 
States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2014).  On appeal, Zareck does not 
argue that the controlled substances for which he was convicted under this statute 
fail to meet this requirement.  Thus, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
clearly erred in concluding that Zareck’s convictions constituted “serious drug 
offenses” under ACCA.7  
 Nevertheless, Zareck claims that two of his three state-court convictions 
cannot count as ACCA predicates because they resulted from pleas of nolo 
                                                                                                                                        
gift or prescription of any controlled substance by any practitioner or professional 
assistant under the practitioner’s direction and supervision . . . .” 
7 According to the government, at least one of the § 780-113(a)(30) counts in each 
of Zareck’s convictions was based on a controlled substance the maximum penalty 
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contendere.  Unfortunately for Zareck, however, all that matters under ACCA is 
whether the defendant has “three previous convictions.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Under Pennsylvania law, any “adjudication of guilt” constitutes 
a “conviction” for purposes of § 924(e)(1), United States v. Jefferson, 88 F.3d 240, 
243 (3d Cir. 1996), and a plea of nolo contendere appears to have the same legal 
effect as a guilty plea, see Eisenberg v. Com., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 512 Pa. 181, 
185 (1986) (“A plea of nolo contendere, when accepted by the court, is, in its 
effect upon the case, equivalent to a plea of guilty. . . .  The judgment of conviction 
follows upon such plea as well as upon a plea of guilty.” (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626, 628 (1910))).  Thus, Zareck cannot hide behind 
his nolo contendere pleas to contest his ACCA status.8  
 We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding Zareck 
eligible for the sentencing enhancement under ACCA. 
III. CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                                                        
for which is fifteen years.  We need not confirm the accuracy of this information 
since Zareck does not challenge it on appeal.  
8 Finally, Zareck appears to argue that his convictions under § 780-113(a)(30) are 
invalid because he was a registered pharmacist at the time he committed the 
offenses.  Whether Zareck is correct is of no moment at this stage; except in the 
narrowest of circumstances not applicable here, defendants facing a sentencing 
enhancement under ACCA are unable to collaterally attack the validity of their 
predicate state-court convictions.  Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 
(1994). 
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 We will uphold the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 
 
